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SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE
ARTICLE 6-JOINDER OF CLAIMS,
CONSOLIDATION AND SEVERANCE
CPLR 602: joint trial denied where disclosure of insurance coverage
in action for declaratory judgment would prejudice defendant in
negligence action.
CPLR 602(a) enables the court to order a joint trial "to avoid
unnecessary delay and costs." Presently, the courts permit consolida-
tion whenever possible, regardless of the diversity of issues. 73 But
implicit in CPLR 602 is the written limitation of CPA 96 that con-
solidation must be effected without prejudice to a substantial right of
any party.74 Naturally, the courts are compelled to make this determina-
tion on a case-by-case basis.
In Kelley v. Yannotti,75 a defendant in a negligence action filed
a third-party complaint against an insurance company. The Court of
Appeals, in ordering a severance pursuant to CPLR 407, stated that
[alt the very beginning of the trial, then, the jury would know
that "insurance" was involved in the case .... The jury might be
more disposed than other wise if it saw fit to render a verdict in
favor of the plaintiffs .... 76
In Orange v. Swiftway Supermarkets, Inc., 77 one action was
brought to recover damages for personal injuries, and a second was
brought for a declaratory judgment with respect to possible insurance
coverage. The personal injury action was to be tried before a jury. A
motion made for joint trial in the supreme court was denied.
The Appellate Division, First Department, affirming, held that
joinder might prejudice the defendants in the first action although
consecutive trials before the same justice would be permissible.
Obviously, the Orange court was utilizing the underlying rationale
of Kelley; and it is equally obvious that a defendant would in fact
be prejudiced if his insurance coverage was expressly brought to the
jury's attention. Separate trials in instances such as these insure to
the defendant his basic right to a fair trial by an impartial jury. More-
73 Dasheff v. Bath & Tennis Club, 25 Misc. 2d 13, 15, 206 N.Y.S.2d 733, 736 (Sup. Ct.
N.Y. County 1959); see also The Quarterly Survey, 42 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 615, 628 (1968).
74 2 WY&M J 602.09 (1969).
75 4 N.Y.2d 603, 152 NE.2d 69, 176 N.Y.S.2d 637 (1958).
76 Id. at 607. 152 NXE.2d at 72, 176 N.Y.S.2d at 641. For a discussion of a similar type
of negligence case basing denial of joinder upon dissimilarity between the negligence
action and an action for a declaratory judgment see The Quarterly Survey, 42 ST. JOHN'S
L. RFv. 615, 627-28 (1968).
77 32 App. Div. 2d 631, 300 N.Y.S.2d 345 (1st Dep't 1969).
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over, the ability to have both causes heard before the same judge will
expedite the disposition of the cases being heard.
ARTICLE 30 - REMEDIwS AND PLEADING
CPLR 3018: Joint tortfeasor may offset medical insurance payments
given to plaintiff by other defendant's insurer.
The general rule in the United States is that payments made to a
plaintiff from a collateral source, e.g., payments made pursuant to a
policy of insurance, do not reduce the amount recoverable from the
tortfeasor whether or not the plaintiff has himself provided for such
payments.78 New York, however, follows the stricter minority rule
which requires that the plaintiff must have in some way paid for his
benefits, is absolutely or conditionally liable to repay his benefactor,
or has subrogated his right to sue for specified payments to his bene-
factor, before these payments will be considered "collateral." 79
It is clear that insurance proceeds are "owed" to a plaintiff and,
hence, "collateral" under the New York rule when the plaintiff himself
has paid for the premiums.80 But it is not as clear when the plaintiff is
a beneficiary of an insurance policy procured by a third person not a
party to the litigation. In Silinsky v. State-Wide Insurance Co., 81 plain-
tiff was covered by her father's insurance policy as a member of the
insured's household. The court indicated that the plaintiff may have
been "owed" the insurance proceeds as a third-party beneficiary of
the insurance contract between her father and the insurer.
However, plaintiff's claim to be a third-party beneficiary of an
insurance contract cannot always be successfully employed. In Moore
v. Leggette,82 for example, the plaintiff was the beneficiary of an in-
78 REPORT OF THE N.Y. LAW REVISION Comm., N.Y. LEG. Doc. No. 65, at 221, 225
(1957): "[Otherwise] the practical effect . . . is to give the wrongdoer an undeserved
windfall."
79 New York's minority view was established by Drinkwater v. Dinsmore, 80 N.Y. 390
(1880) and was recently followed in Coyne v. Campbell, 11 N.Y.2d 372, 183 N.E.2d 891,
230 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1962) (plaintiff physician, treated gratuitously by his colleagues as a
professional courtesy, cannot claim medical expenses in action against the defendant). In
1957, the New York Law Revision Commission proposed an amendment to the CPA
which would have implemented the majority view. However, the Legislature declined
to act on the proposal. Id. at 374, 183 N.E.2d at 891-92, 280 N.Y.S.2d at 2.
80 See Cady v. City of New York, 14 N.Y.2d 660, 198 N.E.2d 901, 249 N.Y.S.2d 868
(1964), aff'g 19 App. Div. 2d 822, 243 N.Y.S.2d 661 (1st Dep't 1963) (reduction of damages
for payment from firemen's pension fund not permitted); Healy v. Rennert, 9 N.Y.2d 202,
173 N.E.2d 777, 213 N.Y.S.2d 44 (1961).
81 30 App. Div. 2d 1, 289 N.Y.S.2d 541 (2d Dep't 1968).
82 24 App. Div. 2d 891, 264 N.Y.S.2d 765 (2d Dep't), aff'd, 18 N.Y.2d 864, 22 N.E2d
737, 276 N.Y.S.2d 118 (1966). "Where such wrongdoer is a person prudent enough to take
out a policy of insurance to indemnify the plaintiff . . . [the wrongdoer] is entitled
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